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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SPECIAL TRIBUNALS-REs JUDICATA-

In the recent case of Board v. Little et al it was decided that the

refusal, by a board of adjustment under a zoning ordinance, to
grant a permit to erect a filling station was res judicata, and that the
proceedings without an allegation of any new conditions or additional facts could not be reopened by the board at the request of the
same parties.2
Where a board or a committee is acting in a ministerial capacity
-that is, doing only what is provided by statute-it can give no
judicial effect to its findings. 8 But, on the other hand, a judgment
on the merits rendered by courts of either an inferior or general
jurisdiction is a conclusive adjudication unless new facts or different parties appear. 4 There is also much authority for the view that
the findings of administrative boards and special tribunals, when
confirmed by courts upon review, prevent the same parties from
reopening their case before the board. 5 But the question before the
court in the instant case is: Can a judgment rendered by an administrative board and not sustained by the court upon review act as a
bar to further proceedings'before the board? It seems that the court
is right in holding that it can. In Harden v. Raleigh6 the court said,
"the board of adjustment is clothed, if not with judicial, at least
with quasi-judicial powers . . . it being its duty to investigate facts
.. . and to exercise discretion . . ." though "every decision is subject to a review by proceedings in the nature of certiorari."7
1195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E. 827 (1928).
Harden first applied to the board for the permit in December 1924.
She was refused, but the ruling of the board was reversed by the Superior
Court, whose decision was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court. Harden
v. Raleigh, 192 N. C 395, 135 S. E. 151 (1926).
'It re Smiling, 193 N. C. 448, 137 S. E. 319 (1927), in which action of
committee appointed by legislature to pass on applications for entrance to
Indian school held not to be res judicata; cf. School District No. 2 of Multnomah County v. Lambert County Treas., 28 Ore. 209, 42 Pac. 221 (1895).
'Brunfield v. Freeman, 80 N. C. 213 (1879), justice of the Peace;
Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla., 1926) ; Benavides v. Garcia, 283 S. W.
611 (Tex., 1926), facts given effect by the highest state court.
Puget Sound Electric Ry. v. Lee, 207 Fed. 860 (1913); Burlingame v.
Brown, 5 R. I. 410 (1858); Barbour v. Town of New Scotland, 71 N. Y. S.
1052 (1901) ; cf. Bluthenthal and Bickart v. Bigbee Brothers & Co., 33 App.
D. C. 209 (1909).
'Mrs.

Supra note 2.

N. C. Code Ann., 2776 (x). But its decisions will not be reviewed unless
arbitrary and oppressive. Rosenthyal v. Goldsboro, 149 N. C. 128, 62 S. E.
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There are cases, however, holding that similar boards and commissions are performing ministerial functions, and that they would,
therefore, not be within the scope of protection of the rule of res
judicata.8

The only other direct authority for the holding in the instant
case is found in two New York cases 9 where decisions of a board
of appeals under a zoning ordinance were upheld by the Supreme
Court. When the applicants attempted to have the board "reopen
and rehear" their petitions without showing a change of conditions,
the court held in both instances that the board acted judicially and
did not have the power to reopen and rehear what was already decided. The court based its decisions on the clause in the Greater
New York Charter 10 which says that the findings of the board shall
be reviewable through a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
which provision so worded expressly prohibits the board from reviewing its own decisions.
'.B. LEwis.
APPEAL AND ERRoR-LAW OF THE CAsE-In a recent South
Carolina case' the facts were as follows: in the original action the

court of common pleas granted the plaintiff punitive damages for
alleged slander, assessing $150.00 damages against the defendant
Cooper and $2,000.00 damages against the other defendant, Cooper's
employer, the Southern Railway Company. On appeal to the Supreme Court this judgment was reversed on the grounds that punitive
damages could not be thus apportioned, and the case was remanded
905, 20 L. R. N. A. S. 809 (1908); Lee v. Waynesville, 184 N. C. 565, 115

S. E.
51 (1922).
'State
extel N. C. C. C. et al v. So. Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 447, 66 S. E. 427
(1909); State ex rel L.C. Caldwell v. James W. Wilson, 121 N. C. 425, 28
S. E. 554 (1897); Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362
(1894); cf. In re Film of Dempsey-Tunney Fight, 22 F. (2d) 837 (1927);
Custer Co. v. Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co., 62 Nebr. 657, 87 N. W. 341 (1901).
Contra: Express Co. v. R. R., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S E. 393, 32 Am. St. Rep.
805, 18 L. R. A. 393 (1892), held to be a court of record but without power
to enforce its judgment.
'People ex rel Swedish Hospital v. Leo, 198 N. Y. S. 397 (1923) ; McGarry
v. Walsh, 210 N. Y. S. 286 (1925); cf. Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 222
(1885); People ex rel Thompson v. Board of Supervisors of County of
Schenectady, 35 Barb. 408 (N. Y., 1861); Dennison v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333
(1923); see People ex rel Brennan v. Walsh, 195 N. Y. S. 264 (1922).
"Sec. 719 (a), similar to the provision in 2776 (x) of N. C. Code Ann.,
supra note 7.
'Jenkins v. Southern Ry. Co. et al, 143 S. E. 13 (S. C., 1928).
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for a new trial. 2 In a later case between other parties this decision
with respect to apportionment of punitive damages was overruled. 8
Plaintiff in the first action, no new trial having been held, sought to
take advantage of the rule in the subsequent case and sued for an
injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the former
judgment. Held, that the former decision was res judicata and the

law of the case, questions of law determined on appeal being binding throughout any subsequent trials of the cause until it is finally
disposed of.
It is well settled in the majority of states that where the facts of
the case are substantially the same as they were upon a former

appeal, questions of law decided upon such former appeal become
the law of the case and may not be reopened or reexamined on the
second appeal. 4 And this is true even though the former decision
was erroneous 5 or has been overruled.6 And the language of the
cases indicates that the courts regard this as an inflexible rule, ad-

mitting of no alternative, though Mr. Justice Holmes states that,
"the phrase, law of the case . .. merely expresses the practice of
the courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not
a limit to their power." 7
Missouri and Nebraska do not follow the general rule, the courts
of those states reserving the liberty of reversing themselves when
convinced that the prior decision was erroneous. 8 Texas allows reconsideration upon a second appeal at the discretion of the court. 9
In Alabama a statute frees the court from adherence to the rule.'0
'Jenkins v. Southern Ry. Co., 130 S. C. 180, 125 S. E. 912 (1924).
'Johnson v. Southern R. Co., 142 S. C. 125, 140 S. E. 443 (1927).

(1927) 6 N. C. L. REv. 330.
'Note (1895), 34 L. R. A. 321.
'Jones v. C. & W. C. Ry. Co., 65 S. C.410, 43 S.E. 884 (1903).

See

'Thompson, Judge, v. Louisville Bkg. Co., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1611, 55 S.W.
1080 (1900). Where the judges unanimously disapproved of the former decision and where such former decision had been overruled, it was nevertheless held to be binding. Saulsbury v. Iverson, 73 Ga. 733 (1884).
'Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444, 32 Sup. Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.
Ed. 1152, 1156 (1912).
'Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 496, 141 S. W. 650 (1911) ; Murphy et al v.
Barron, 286 Mo. 390, 228 S.W. 492\(1921) ; Hastings v. Foxworthy, 45 Neb.
676, 63 N. W. 955, 34 L. R. A. 321 '(1895) ; Eccles v. Walker et al, 75 Neb.
722, 106 N. W. 977 (1906). Particularly full and lucid discussions of the
rule may be found in Mangold v. Bacon and Hastings v. Foxworthy.
'Meyers v. Dittmar, 47 Tex. 373 (1877) ; Kempner v. Huddleston, 90 Tex.
182, 37 S. W. 1066 (1896).
"Ala. Civ. Code (1923), §10287.
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An exception is made where a state court has followed a federal
decision on the first appeal (in a matter within the jurisdiction of
the federal court, such as the construction of a federal statute) arid,
between the time of the first and second appeals in the state court,
the federal decision has been overruled. In such case the state
court follows the latest decision of the federal court." The same
exception obtains in cases where the federal courts follow the state
courts.'

2

Another exception has been made where the prior decision

had been overruled and it became necessary to reverse the judgment,
3
on the second appeal, on other grounds.'
As in the case furnishing the subject of this comment, the law
of the case is often confused with res judicata or stare decisis. The
three terms should be distinguished. Res judicata implies that the
case has been finally determined, and stare decisis is a rule of precedent. Hence the law of the case can hardly be said to be based
directly on either of them. 1 4

Perhaps the most accurate statement

is that the law of the case is "in the nature of res judiata.J' 15
In states adhering to the rule and refusing to allow the same
question to be raised on a second appeal, the only way such question
may be reopened is by a petition to rehear. The appellant is not
permitted to escape the safeguards and requirements exacted for
rehearings by merely taking another appeal. 1'

HENRY BRANDIS,
BANKS

AND

BANKING-CONSTITUTIONAL

JR.

LAW-STATUTORY

PREsumPTIONs-Writs of error were brought by Ferry, formerly a
bank director, and by the executor of one Kramer, a deceased director, to set aside judgments against them in suits by depositors in
the bank, on the ground that the statutes of Kansas, purporting to
establish the directors' liability were contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Revised
Statutes, Kansas, 1923, 9-163, 9-164, require directors to examine

the affairs of the bank, and impose individual responsibility for
'Sands

v. American Ry. Express Co., 159 Minn. 25, 198 N. W. 402

(1924); American Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 158 Ark. 493, 250 S. W. 540

(1923).

"St. Louis & S. F. Ry. et al v. Quinette, 251 Fed. 773 (1918).

"Barton v. Thompson, 56 Iowa 571, 9 N. W. 899 (1881).
1,(1909)

22 HAxvtau) L. Rav. 438.
"Mangold v. Bacon, supra note 8.
"Holley v. Smith, 132 N. C. 36, 43 S. E. 501 (1903) ; Hospital Ass'n. v.
A. C. L. Ry. Co. et al, 157 N. C. 460, 73 S.E. 242 (1911).
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deposits received during insolvency, in case of failure to do as required, and also providing that insolvency or failing circumstances
at the time of receiving a deposit shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insolvency, and of assent by him to the receipt
of the deposit at such time. Held: The statute is not in violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the judgment should be affirmed. Ferry v. Ramsey, 48 S. Ct. 443 (1928).
While there is a conflict in the decisions, the weight of authority
sustains the power of the legislature to declare, even in criminal
cases, what shall be presumptive evidence of any pertinent fact.'
Statutes similar to the ones now under discussion, which create a
criminal as well as a civil liability on the part of the officers or
directors of a bank, have been held to be no infringement of the constitutional guaranty of due process, such statutes declaring that the
receipt of the deposit .during insolvency shall be, in criminal and
civil suits respectively, prima fade evidence of intent to defraud, or
prima facie evidence of knowledge of condition. 2 North Carolina is
in sharp contrast. C. S., section 224 (g) makes the director criminally liable by declaring it a felony to receive deposits with knowledge of insolvency. An interpretation of this section by the Supreme
Court places the burden upon the state of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a deposit and the fact that the officer or
3
director had knowledge of the failing condition of the bank.
Statutes similar to the ones under discussion seem rather novel,
although legislatures have frequently, in the past, declared what
shall constitute a prima facie case. For example, they have enacted
that an injury will be prima facie evidence of negligence;4 that
possession of whiskey shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
sell;5 that oath and examination of the mother of a bastard child
shall be presumptive evidence against the person accused;O that
possession of opium shall create a presumption of guilt ;7 that finding of apparatus for distilling shall be prima facie evidence that the
person in actual possession of the premises knew of the existence
1
Hawes v. State of Georgia, 258 U. S. 1; 42 S. Ct. 204 (1922); Manly v.
State, 144 S. E. 170 (1928, Georgia). Contra: Hammond v. State, 78 Oh. St.
15; 84 N. E. 416 (1916).
Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56; 45 N. E. 303; L. R. A. 1915C, 720.
'State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300; 121 S. E. 615 (1924).
'Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, 54 Oh. St. 10; 42 N. E. 768 (1896).
'State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630; 50 S. E. 506 (1905).
EState v. Rogers, 119 N. C. 793; 26 S. E. 142 (1896).
'Yee Hem v. U. S., 268 U. S. 178; 45 S. Ct. 470.
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of the apparatus.8 However, this legislative power to enact what
shall be prima facie evidence is subject to two limitations: (1) The
rules of evidence expressly enshrined in the constitution, O and under
these rules such legislative enactments are not unconstitutional unless made conclusive of the rights of the party;2O and (2) there
must be a reasonable connection between the fact proven and the
one to be inferred. 1 If the law provides that certain facts are conclusive proof, an arbitrary mandate, it is unconstitutional. 12
As a practical matter, knowledge by directors of insolvency
seldom keeps the bank from continuing to receive deposits. The
officer who happens to know that his bank is in difficulty, will do
all he can to secure the necessary funds to tide the situation over.
The general rule is, however, that the average director knows nothing of the insolvency until the cashier absconds, or, in rare instances,
he is informed of the fact by the state bank examiner. The bank in
the instant case was insolvent for several years before closing its
doors. When the state experts fail to discover the situation, it is
absurd to think that the directorate, consisting, perhaps, of the
"butcher, baker and candle-stick maker," will be aware of a shortage
in accounts. Therefore, the investigation required by the statutes
will not reveal the situation to the director and the effect of the
statutes is to impute a knowledge that he has no reasonable way of
ascertaining. Clearly this is so in the instant case as regards
Kramer, whose illness prevented his attendance to business. Mr.
Justice Holmes, writing the majority opinion, in which he does not
refer to any previous cases in point, goes upon the theory that since
the legislature could have made the liability absolute, they could, of
course, raise a prima facie case. This position is criticized by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, dissenting as to Kramer, who contends that it
is what the legislature has actually enacted that must be taken into
consideration. The latter view is preferable; otherwise, the question
would resolve itself into whether the legislature had power to enact
such a statute, not whether there is a statute covering a definite
'Hawes v. State of Georgia, supra note 1.
'2 WIG oRE §1356.
'Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35; 31
S. Ct. 136 (1910).
'McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79; 36 S. Ct. 498
(1916).
" State v. Beach, 43 N. E. 949; 36 L. R. A. 179 (1896, Indiana).
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situation. Apparently it is the meaning of the majority holding
that the legislature did not do even as much as it could have done.
From an economic viewpoint such legislation would seem likely
to detract from banking stability. It might have the tendency to
enhance public confidence, but in the end, it will have the effect of
keeping the more conservative business man off the directorate.
DAVID M. FEILD.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SPEcIAL LEGISLATION UNDER

NORTH

Constitution of Georgia prohibits special legislation which conflicts with or overlaps any
general law.' The Supreme Court of Georgia defines a "general
law" as one which operates uniformly throughout the state, upon all
2
persons or things, or all persons or things of a class within the state,
excluding no person or thing within the state or class from the force
of the particular law.3 Where the legislature classifies, the groups
or classes so set apart must have distinguishing characteristics which
4
naturally and reasonably relate to the subject-matter of the law.
A statute providing that juries shall have the power to fix sentences in certain criminal cases in counties having from 60 to 70,000
was held special on the grounds that population was not a reasonable
and natural basis of classification. 5 The same was held true for a
statute providing that towns having between 400 and 500 population,
and being situated across a county line, might, by a majority vote
of the inhabitants, change the county line so that the town would be
wholly within one county.6 Likewise, a game law which applied to
only one county was held to be a special law3
The Georgia court has held that it is of no consequence that there
be but one person or thing within the class, if the basis of classifi'Ga. Const. Art. I, §4, par. 1.
CAROLINA AND GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONS-The

'Lorentz v. Alexander, 87 Ga. 444, 13 S. E. 632 (1891) ; Abbott v. Comrs.,
160 Ga. 657, 129 S. E. 38 (1925); Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E.
726, 20 A. L. R. 1105 (1922) ; 25 R. C. L. 815-816.
'Note 2 supra; Futrell v. George, 135 Ga. 265, 269, 69 S. E. 182 (1910);
Thomas v. Austin, 103 Ga. 701, 30 S. E. 627 (1898).
'State v. King, 144 S. E. 6 (Ga., 1928) ; Mayor of Danville v. Wilkinson
County, 143 S. E. 769 (Ga., 1928) ; Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S. E.
457 (1913), ". . . basis of classification must have some reasonable relation
to the subject-matter of the law, and must furnish a legitimate ground of
differentiation"; Wright v. Hirsh, 155 Ga. 229, 116 S. E. 795 (1923).
5 King v. State, supra note 4.
Mayor of Danville v. Wilkinson County, supra note 4.
'Downs v. State, 158 Ga. 669, 124 S. E. 166 (1924).
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cation has a natural and reasonable relation to the law. An act
placing a special tax on automobile dealers in counties having over
150,000 population was held to be a general law, although only one
county was affected, on the grounds that population was, in the
particular case, a natural and reasonable basis of differentiation;8
similarly, an act providing for a change from a fee to a salary system
for county officials in all counties of over 200,000 population was held
to be a general law.9 The conception of "general" and "special" law,
held by the Supreme Court of Georgia, seems to be in accord with
that of the majority of the courts of the United States. 10
The North Carolina Constitution allows the legislature to pass
local, private, or special acts or resolutions, except in certain specifled cases, for example, legislation "relating to health, sanitation,
and the abatement of nuisances . .. authorizing the laying out,
opening, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets or alleys;
relating to ferries or bridges .. .establishing or changing the lines
of school districts. ..
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has given the term "general law" a broader meaning than that given by the Supreme Court
of Georgia. It is not essential, under the North Carolina decisions,
that a law operate uniformly upon all persons or things, or upon all
persons or things of a class throughout the whole state in order that
it be a "general law." An act to provide districts in one particular
county, wherein sanitary sewers or sanitary measures might be provided, was held constitutional on the grounds that it did not come
within the class of acts relating to "health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances." It was suggested in the opinion, however, that
the act was not local, private, or special since it applied generally to
the whole county.' 2 This suggestion is repeated in a subsequent
decision, which held an act to create a sanitary district within certain described boundaries a special act.' 8 Nor does the North Carolina court, in cases involving special legislation, invoke the rule that
classification must have a reasonable relation to the subject matter.
'Adams Motor Co. v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818, 102 S. E. 440 (1920).
'Abbott v. Comrs., supra note 2.

"0Comrs v. McMullen, 134 I1. 170, 25 N. E. 676 (1890) ; Givens v. Hillsborough County, 46 Fla. 502, 35 So. 88, 110 Am.St. Rep. 104 (1903); 25
R. C. L. "Statutes" §66.
' N. C. Const., Art. I, §29 (1917).
v. IIowerton Engineering Co., 188 N. C. 39, 123 S. E. 479 (1924).

'Reed

"Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N. C. 722, 143 S.E. 530 (June, 1928).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court defines a special law as one
which is "directly addressed to the accomplishment of a single designed purpose at a specific spot."1 4 An act. commanding the commissioners of a particular county to build a bridge at a specified
spot was held special.' 5 So with an act providing for the establishment of a school district in a certain location ;16 an act to establish a
tubercular hospital at a certain place ;17 and, an act to create a sanitary district within territory described by metes and bounds.' 8
A. B. RAYmER.
CRIMINAL LAW-ARREST AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANTINTOXICATING LIQUORs-Defendant, a deputy sheriff, arrested
Spivey, who was walking along the road with a suitcase, on information that he was transporting liquor. Spivey resisted with a
heavy stick (deadly weapon), and the defendant shot Spivey with
his pistol. The defendant was indicted for assault and battery. The

presiding judge instructed as a matter of law, that under the evidence the defendant did not have a right to make the arrest. This
was held to be error in a recent decision.'
At common law, an officer could under no circumstances arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor not amounting to a breach of
the peace committed in his presence. 2 Many American states adhere
to the common law rule.3 Many other jurisdictions hold that an
officer
peace,
In
lowed

may arrest for any misdemeanor, less than a breach of the
4
committed in his presence.
the instant case, the North Carolina court has apparently folthe latter rule, relying on a number of cases which do not

" Day v. Comrs., 191 N. C. 780, 133 S. E. 164 (1926) ; note 13 supra.
' Note 14 supra.
"'Board
of Trustees of Fairmont Graded School Dist. v. Mutual Loan and
Trust Co., 181 N. C .306, 107 S.E. 130 (1921) ; Robinson v. Comrs of Brunswick
1 County, 182 N. C. 590, 109 S.E. 855 (1921).
Armstrong v. Comrs., 185 N. C. 405, 117 S. E. 388 (1923).
' Note 13 supra.
'State v. Sherman Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928).
'CLARK, CRIMINAL PRocMrmn (1 ed.), 9.40; 1 BisiaoP, NEv CRIMINAL
PROCEDURF, 131, §183.
'Stittgen v. Rundle, 99 Wis. 78, 74 N. W. 536 (1898) ; Schnider v. Montross, 158 Mich. 263, 122 N. W. 534 (1909); Commonwealth v. Wright, 158
MZass. 149, 33 N. E. 82 (1893).
'Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W. 904 (1887) ; Stearns v.
Titus, 193 N. Y. 272, 85 N. E. 1077 (1908); Conkling v. Whitmore. 132 Ill.
App. 574 (1907) ; Collegenia v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 425, 132 Pac. 375 (1913).
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support so broad a proposition.5 In Neal v. Joyner the arrest was
on suspicion of a felony, and in Martin v. Houck, State v. Blackwelder, and State v. Fowlerthe arrest was for a felony already committed; State v.McAfee, for a breach of the peace committed in the
officer's presence; State v. McNinch, State v. Hunter, and Brewer
v. Wynne for a nuisance committed in the officer's presence.
It seems that previously the North Carolina court followed the
common law rule.6 Apparently the first extension of that rule was
in the case of a nuisance committed in the officer's presence, which
was a misdemeanor, though not a breach of the peace. 7 Another
extension was made by way of dictum in State v. Campbell,8 and in
State v. Simmons9 and State v. Jenkins 6 this dictum appears to become law. On this theory the decision may be supported without
further discussion.
Concerning the search of the suitcase without a warrant, C. S.
3411(f)"- explicitly requires an officer upon discovering one in the
act of transporting liquor in any vehicle, to seize the liquor, and
arrest the person in charge. It explicitly denies the officer the right
to search any vehicle, or baggage accompanying any vehicle,1 2 for
'Neal v. Joyner, 89 N. C. 287 (1883) ; State v. McAfee, 107 N. C. 812, 12
S. E. 435. 10 L. R. A. 607 (1890) ; State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796, 11 S. E. 366
(1890) ; State v. McNinch, 90 N. C. 695 (1884) ; Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C.
317, 54 S.E. 291 (1906); Brewer v. Wynne, 163 N. C. 319, 79 S. E. 629
(1913) ; State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 910, 90 S. E. 408 (1916) ; State v. Blackwelder, 182 N. C. 899, 109 S. E. 644 (1921) ; State v. Campbell, 182 N. C. at
p. 914, 110 S. E. 86 (1921).

'State v. Belk, 76 N. C. p. 13 (1877), "A peace officer may arrest upon
suspicion of a felony and for a breach of the peace and for 'some other misdemeanors.' But these others we conceive are only those which some statute
gives a right to arrest for without a warrant."
"State v. Hunter; State v. McNinch; Brewer v. Wynne, supra note 5.
'Supra note 5.

'183 N. C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (1922).
"Supra note 1.

' "When any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting, in violation of the law, intoxicating liquor in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any
and all intoxicating liquor found therein being transported contrary to law.
Whenever intoxicating liquor transported or possessed illegally shall be seized
by an officer he shall take possession of the vehicle and team, automobile, boat,
air or water craft, or other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge.
...Provided. that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any
officer to search any automobile or other vehicle or baggage of any person
without a search warrant duly issued, except where the officer sees or has
absolute personal knowledge that there is intoxicating liquor in such vehicle or
baggage." This proviso is not in the Volstead Act-U. S. C. A.-Title 27, §40.
See Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 227 (1924).
' Construction in State v. Jenkins, supra, note 1, at page 750..
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liquor without a search warrant unless: (1) he sees, or (2) has
absolute personal knowledge that there is liquor in such vehicle or
baggage. It appears under the construction in the instant case that
if Spivey had been riding in a vehicle with the suitcase containing
liquor, the officer, under such information as he had here, 13 could
not have arrested him without a search warrant. Should Spivey
have been subject to arrest without a warrant because he was walking, and not riding in a vehicle?,
A. W. GHOLSON, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-NECESSITY OF CHARGING JURY ON DEGREES OF

State v. Newso nlw a conviction of murder in the first
degree was reversed because the trial judge failed to charge the jury
on second degree murder. It seems that the evidence tended to show
that the homicide was committed by lying in wait, or in an attempt
to commit rape, or after premeditation and deliberation. The new
trial was granted on the ground that the evidence presented an inference of second degree murder.
"At common law homicide was either murder or manslaughter
and there were no degrees of murder." 2 In 1794 Pennsylvania enacted a statute which established degrees of murder.$ One hundred
years later the Legislature of North Carolina enacted a similar
statute. 4 Many other states have similar statutory provisions. 5 But
the Federal Courts of the United States still maintain the common
law idea of one degree of murder. 6
The judicial constructions of these similar statutes are not in
harmony. In the birthplace of the definition of the degrees of murder, a peremptory instruction which deprives the jury of the possibility of determining the degree of murder, even though all the evi7
dence tends to show a murder in the first degree, is erroneous.
The reason for this holding is based on the assumption that the
MURDER-In

' "Knowledge being a firm belief. Personal knowledge-knowledge of the
truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which is original, and does
not depend on information or hearsay." State v. Simmons, 192 N. C. at p. 697,
135 S.E. 866 (1926) ; State v. DeHerrodora, 192 N. C. 749, 136 S.E. 6 (1926).
1195 N. C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928).
'WHARTON, HomicIm (3rd. Ed. by Bowlby) p. 147.

3 Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §7994.

'The Act of 1893 (now C. S. §§4200, 4642).
'Note, 21 A. L. R. 628 (1921).
'United States v. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. Case No. 15, 978 (1868).
'Commonwealth v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39, 112 Atl. 38 (1920).
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judge has invaded the province of the jury, and on the belief, set
forth in Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. 396, 399 (1864), that
"many men have been convicted of murder in the second degree, who
really guilty of a higher crime, would have escaped punishment altogether but for this distinction in degrees so carefully committed by
statute to juries." This viewpoint is upheld in several jurisdictions.8
The contrary view is that if all of the evidence and inferences
tend to show that the homicide was committed in a manner designated by the statute as murder in the first degree, a peremptory
charge which omits second degree murder is not erroneous. 9 This
view is maintained in spite of statutory provisions that the jury
shall determine the degree of the murder. These opinions are based
on two major reasons: first, that the judge may determine the sufficiency of the evidence; second, that, if there is neither any evidence
nor any inference of second degree murder, it is the duty of the
judge to charge the jury to find either first degree murder or an
acquittal.
North Carolina at one time followed the doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts.' 0 The contrary view was later adopted in State v.
Spivey." This contrary view has continued to be the doctrine of
the North Carolina courts, and it is followed and upheld in State v.

Newsone,12 the entire court agreeing on this point of law. The
court disagreed on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence,
four members saying that there was an inference of second degree
murder. It would seem that the evidence for such an inference was

a confession made by the defendant to a psychiatrist appointed by
the trial judge. The important part of the confession was this:
"He said that he cut her after he caught up with her; that he cut
her because she said she was going to tell her father."'3 Does it not
seem that the reasonable and fair inference to be drawn from this

confession is that the killing was done in a willful, deliberate, and
'Jones v. State, 128 Tenn. 493, 161 S. W. 1016 (1913) ; State v. Gray, 19
Nev. 212, 8 Pac. 456 (1885).
'People v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 476, 126 Pac. 143 (1912) ; People v. Page, 198
Mich. 524, 164 N. W. 755 (1917) ; State v. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 S. W. 452
(1898) ; State v. Zeller, 77 N. J. L. 619, 73 Atl. 489 (1909) ; King v. State, 57
Texas Crim. Rep. 363, 123 S. W. 135 (1909) ; State v. Pepoon, 62 Wash. 635,
114 Pac. 449 (1911).
State v. Gadberry, 117 N. C. 811, 23 S. E. 477 (1895).
'State v. Spivey, 151 N. C. 676, 65 S. E. 995 (1909), directly overruling
State v. Gadberry, supra note 10.
'" State
1. 559, 143, S. E. 187, 191 (1928).
State v.
v. Newsome,
Newsome, supra
195 N.note
C. 552,
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premeditated manner? A willful, deliberate and premeditated kiil14
ing is murder in the first degree.
While purporting to follow the doctrine that, where all of the
evidence and the fair inferences tend to show a murder in the first
degree, the trial judge should instruct the jury that it is their duty
to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree or of not
guilty, this case will make it extremely dangerous for a judge, under
any circumstances, to give a peremtory charge omitting second degree murder.
A. K. SMITH.
-VIDENcE-ADMISSIONS AND DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
-ARE THEY LIMITED BY RULES REQUIRING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
AND BY THE OPINION RuLE?-A recent North Carolina case' in-

volves the admissibility in evidence of declarations against interest
and extra-judicial admissions. The action was brought by insurance
companies, pursuant to subrogation agreements between them and
the insured whereby the latter assigned his right of action, against
the railroad, to recover the sums paid to the insured for cotton
destroyed by fire, the cotton having been stored on a platform on
the railroad right of way. On cross-examination by counsel for the
defendant the insured was asked whether he had not, prior to the
signing of the subrogation receipt, stated that in his opinion the
railroad company was not responsible for the fire. Over the plaintiff's objection the insured was permitted to answer, "I expressed
the opinion that I did not think the railroad company burned it.
Yes, sir; I did that." The insured further testified that he did not
of his own knowledge know how the fire occurred, that he did not
on that day notice the conditions around the platform. On appeal
to the Supreme Court the plaintiff contended that the testimony was
incompetent, since it permitted the witness to give his opinion as to
the cause of the fire when he had no personal knowledge thereof.
The defendant sought to sustain the trial court's ruling on the ground
that the testimony presented a declaration against interest. The
court treated the reported utterance as an admission; and, in granting a new trial, held, "But even an admission must be the acknowl14
C. S., §4200.
'Royal Insurance Company v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 195 N. C

693, 143 S. E. 516 (1928).
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ectgement of a fact and not of a mere opinion having no foundation
either in knowledge or from observation."
It is obvious that the defendant's contention that the reported
testimony was a declaration against interest could not be sustained,
as the court briefly showed by quoting the prerequisites for the competency of such declarations from the leading case in this jurisdiction.2 An essential requirement is that the declarant be dead; in
this case he was actually the witness.
A more difficult situation presents itself when the utterance is
considered as an (extra-judicial) admission. An admission is a
statement of a party to the action.3 In the instant case the insured
was not technically a party; but he was the assignor of the plaintiff,
and this jurisdiction holds, 4 as do all of the others,5 that any competent declaration made by the assignor prior to' the assignment is
admissible against the assignee. The testimony was therefore not
open to the objection that it was not made by a party.
The leading commentators have differed as to the basis for the
competency of admissions as an exception to the rule excluding hearsay;6 however, it is now generally conceded that admissions are
received as substantive evidence, for the truth of the matter asserted.7 The statement here, although reported on the witness stand
by the admitter himself, was such as the hearsay rule would exclude,
unless it could be treated as an exception thereto, for it was an extra'Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906).
'Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) ; 2 WIGMORE, EviDENCE (1923) § 1048.
'Shaffer v. Gaynor, 117 N. C. 15, 23 S. E. 154 (1895).
'2 Wi oRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §1080 et seq.

'The party whose declarations are offered against him is in no position to
object on the score of lack of confrontation or of lack of opportunity for crossexamination. He ought not to be heard to complain that he was not under
oath. All of the substantial reasons for excluding hearsay are therefore wanting." E. M. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30
YALE L. J. 355, 361.
"The Hearsay Rule, therefore, is not a ground of objection when an opponent's assertions are offered against him; in such case, his assertions are
termed admissions. But the Hearsay Rule is a ground of objection by the
first party when the opponent's assertions are offered in his favor; and such
statements are then not termed 'admissions.'" 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (1923),
§1048.
"The competency of an admission is not so much an exception to the rule
excluding hearsay as based upon a quasi-estoppel which controls the right of a
1party to disclaim responsibility for any of his statements. He is concluded as
to the admissibility of the declaration but not necessarily as to its effect."
CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911) §1292.
E. M. Morgan, supra, note 6.
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judicial utterance, not under oath, not subject to cross-examination,
and was offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein.
In rejecting this offer because the admitter was not testimonially
qualified by personal knowledge or observation, the North Carolina
court takes a rather unique stand, which is not in harmony with the
prevailing view. The admission is always offered against the declarant or, as here, against one having an identity of interest, so he
8
should not object to its being received as prima facie trustworthy.
The mental attitude of the admitter, who should be required to ascertain at his peril the truth of the facts by him asserted, 9 is sought
in such a case to be shown; and it is natural to assume that he will
not make admissions against himself unless they are true. 10 It is
sought by the introduction of admissions especially to discredit the
party's present claim,"1 but this does not place a hardship upon the
admitter, who may offer any evidence which serves as an explanation
for his former assertion.' 2 In Reed v. McCord,'1 the action was for
personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the defendant's negligence. The extra-judicial statements of the defendant as of his own
knowledge, as to the circumstances and causes of the injury, were
held admissible, although he was not present when the injury occurred, and his statements were not based on personal knowledge.
Ross v. Salminen14 is a case of similar facts and holding. Cases holding that the admitter need not be testimonially qualified by personal
knowledge or observation are numerous and seem to be sustained by
the weight of authority.' 5
For similar reasons admissions are not subject to the limitations
16
of the opinion rule.
'Ibid.

'Ross v. Salminen, 191 Fed. 504 (1911).

" Kitchen v. Robbins, 29 Ga. 713 (1860), which is probably the leading cake

in support of the theory that the admitter need not be testimonially qualified,
and which held, that the extra-judicial admission by the defendant innkeeper
that the plaintiff guest had lost goods in his house was competent, although
founded on statements made to him by the plaintiff.
*'2IVIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §1053.
E. M. Morgan, supra note 6.

2

160 N. Y. 330, 54 N. E. 737 (1899).
Supra note 9.

14

'Miller

v. Denman, 8 Yerg. 233 (Tenn. 1835), the earliest case; Read v.

Reppert, 194 Iowa 620, 190 N. W. 32 (1922), one of the latest; 2

WIGmOi E,

EVIDENCE (1923) §1053; JoNs, THE LAW Op EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CAsEs, 3d. ed.,
§296 (1924); CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911) §1305.

"8"The Opinion Rule does not limit the use of a party's admissions. The
reason for that rule does not apply to a party's admissions. Moreover, every
case presented in the allegations of pleadings and witnesses includes both facts

74

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

The source from which a knowledge of the facts is derived by
the admitter is a circumstance for the jury to consider in estimating
the weight of the evidence. 17 In this case the admitter clearly did
not have personal knowledge of the facts admitted, but it is submitted that his utterance was nevertheless a competent admission and
should have been received in evidence.
CHARLEs F. Rouse.
EVIDENcE-DSTINcTION BETWEEN VIcARIOUS ADMISSIONS OF
AGENT AND RES GESTAE-AGENT'S NARRATIVE OF PAST TRANSACTIONS ADMISSIBLE-In an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff while working for defendant company, an employer's
liability insurance investigator testified that he had a talk with the
foreman of the bricklayers, in charge of the work in which plaintiff
was injured, after the accident about witnesses for the case, and
that the foreman informed him he thought one of three men recently
discharged had caused the injury to plaintiff. Held: Testimony admissible as admission of defendant through agent acting within the
scope of his authority. Duke v. Luke, 143 S. E. 692 (Va., 1928).
The rule for vicarious admissions is usually stated to be: the
declarations of an agent are admissible as admissions against his
principal (1) when made with express authority; or (2) when made
within the scope of his agency while engaged in the very business
about which the declaration is made, as part of the res geslae.1
Declarations expressly authorized do not often arise in litigation,
and are easily dealt with.
It is believed that the term res gestae in this connection might
well be discarded for the reason that it has so many meanings, inapplicable here, that it leads to confusion. 2 The use of the phrase
and inferences without discrimination. To extend the arbitrary trivialities ot
the Opinion Rule to parties' admissions would be the extreme of futility. 2
WIGMOaE, EVIDENCE (1923) §1053, (2).
T15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1096, where Kitchen v. Robbins, supra note 10, is
discussed and cases in point cited.
McComb v. R. R., 70 N. C. 178 (1874) (statement inadmissible although

clearly authorized); R. R. v. Smitherman, 178 N. C. 599, 101 S. E. 208
(1919) ; see Nance v. Norfolk Southern R. L, 189 N. C. 638, 127 S. E. 635
(1925) (where lack of authority for agent's statement is apparent, the court
states the rule to be: "The agent's statement to these witnesses was not competent as a declaration characterizing or qualifying an act presently done
within the scope of his agency and constituting a part of the res gestae; it
was narrative of a past event, and, of course, inadmissible against the defendant").
'Wigmore, EVIDENCE (1923), §§1767, 1048, 1069.
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to allow the admission of contemporaneous statements, and the requirement that the declaration be made at the time of the transaction
referred to,3 has probably resulted through a confusion of the admissions exception to the hearsay rule with the spontaneous statements exception.4 The two have nothing whatever in common.
Spontaneous statements are admitted as evidence, regardless of the
agency, because of the probability of the truth of such statements. 5
The use of the phrase to describe operative utterances which form
part of the transaction authorized is also misleading. 6 Using the
term in this meaning, some courts have refused to admit statements
made in separate transactions clearly within the scope of the declarant's agency.7 Such declarations are verbal acts, are offered to
prove not the truth of what was said, but that it was said, and are
not hearsay any more than any other physical act sought to be
proved. 8
The basis of the rule allowing admissions of agents is: that the
extrajudicial declarations of a party-opponent are allowed in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule for the obvious reason that the
party whose declarations are offered against him is in no position to
' See McEntyre v. Levi Cotton Mills, 132 N. C. 598, 44 S. E. 109 (1903)
(declaration subsequent to transaction inadmissible).
" Although unauthorized, the declaration may be admitted as a spontaneous
statement. Cf. Coalgate Co. v. Hurst, 25 Okla. 588, 107 Pac. 657 (1910),
where court said of statement of employee to co-employee thirty minutes after
the accident, inadmissible: "Was it part of res gestae? If so, it should have
been admitted, otherwise not. Was the alleged statement spontaneous and so
connected with the main fact under consideration as to illustrate its character,
or to form in conjunction with it one continuous act?" (Are res gestae and
"spontaneous statement" synonymous?)
'Wigmore, EvmNcE (1923), §1747.
"However, such use is the most plausible and legitimate made of the phrase
(e.g., as part of a verbal act, a res gesta).
"Such utterance may be of three different sorts: (1) Words the utterance
of which is a fact forming part of the issue (e.g., a contract or slander) ; (2)
words uttered at the time of doing an equivocal act, and forming part of the
total conduct which determines the legal significance of the act (e.g., words of
ownership accompanying occupation of land); and (3) words used circumstantially as indirect evidence (e.g., words of notification, as evidence that the
person notified received knowledge)." Wigmore, EVIDENCE (1923), §1746.
Robertson v. Plymouth Co., 165 N. C. 4, 80 S. E. 894 (1914) (contract);
cf. Laudie v. Western Union, 126 N. C. 431, 35 S. E. 810 (1900) (misinformation of telegraph operator, assurance of delivery).
" McComb v. R. R., supra note 1; State Bank v. Bracton Fruit Juice Co.,
208 N. Y. 492, 102 N. E. 591 (1913) ; Carroll v. E. Tenn., Va. and Ga. Ry.,
82 Ga. 452, 10 S. E. 163 (1889) (declarations authorized but subsequent to
event not admitted).
'Wigmore, EvIDENCE (1923), §1768 (hearsay rule excludes extrajudicial
utterances only where offered as assertions to evidence the truth of what they
assert).
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object on the score of lack of confrontation of the declarant, lack
of opportunity for cross-examination, or that the admitter was not
under oath. 9 The declarations of the agent, on the other hand, are
admissible because through authorization they become declarations
of the party-opponent. Therein is combined an evidence rule with
a substantive rule of the law of agency. In dealing with the declarations of the principal himself, there is no mention of any res gestae
requirement, because such declarations are obviously offered as admissions about the transaction and not as a part of the transaction
itself. Wherefore the ritualistic recital of a res gestae requirement
in dealing with admissions through agency?
The phrase is doubtless used because authorized statements frequently do accompany authorized acts.' 0 But with equal frequence
authorized statements, purely narrative, made after the event, are
properly admitted.'1
Conversely, unauthorized contemporaneous
declarations of the agent (not being "spontaneous" declarations)
should be excluded. The distinct weight of authority makes the
criterion whether the agent has acted within the scope of his authority, regardless of res gestae, or the time of utterance, or its narrative
tenor.' 2 The authority to make the statement, not to do the act
prescribed, is important.' 3
9

E. M. Morgan, Admissions as Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE

LAW JouImAL 355; WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE (1923), §1048.

"Styles v. Manufacturing Co., 164 N. C. 376, 80 S. E. 417 (1913) (memo
by agent while cutting logs for principal); Gazzam v. Insurance Co., 155 N. C.
330, 71 S. E. 434 (1911) (statement made during sale of insurance policy);
cf. Xenia Bank v. Stewart, 114 U. S. 227 (1884).
"Bank v. Wilson, 12 N. C. 489 (1828) (cashier's declaration concerning
past transactions); Nelson v. Charleston, and W. C. Ry., 92 S. C. 151, 121
S. E. 198 (1912) (by conductor day after the wreck to person from whom he
was attempting to get a statement) ; Citizens' Bank of Tifton v. Timmons, 15
Ga. App. 772, 84 S. E. 232 (1915) (time of utterance unimportant); Iron
Clad Mfg. Co. v. Stanfield and Son, 112 Md. 360, 76 Atl. 854 (1910) (superintendent's statement concerning damage to factory floor).
'Barnes v. R. R., 161 N. C. 581, 77 S. E. 855 (1913); Bank v. Stewart,
supra note 10; Myer v. Great Western Ins. Co., 104 Calif. 381, 38 Pac. 82
(1894). Contra: McComb v. R. R., supra note 1. See Rumbough v. Improvement Co., 112 N. C. 751, 17 S. E. 536 (1893) ; cf. Southerland v. R. R.,
106 N. C. 100, 11 S. E. 189 (1890) (admission of tort liability) ; Coal Company
v. Hughes, 224 Fed. 58 (C. C. A., 8th, 1915) (engineer's statement before
coroner inadmissible); Warner v. Me. R. R. Co., 111 Me. 149, 88 Atl. 403,
47 L. R. A. N. S. 830 (1913), note; Dumie v. A. C. L. Ry., 161 N. C. 520, 77
S. E. 756 (1913) (endorsement by agent on bill of lading of shortage in
shipment within scope of authority. Why not the same criterion for subsequent statements?).
" Johnson v. Insurance Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916) (agent
authorized to sell policy but not to make statements concerning the sale at
maturity of policy). Authority to do the act described is often confused with
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The court in the principal case was not embarrassed by the ambiguous requirement of res gestac, but recognized the basis of the
rule as that of authorization, and properly admitted declarations by
the agent of the corporation, in response to timely inquiries in an
authorized investigation, relating to matters under his charge, to
which it was his duty to reply. 14
J. H. ANDERSON, JR.
INJUNCTIONS-NUISANCE-FiLLING, STATIONS IN RESIDENTIAL

SEcTIONs-Defendant proposed to erect a filling station in a residential district. He demurred to a bill to enjoin which alleged that
the station would be ten feet distant from plaintiff's home, and a
continuing nuisance because of smoke, noise, noxious gases, odors,
danger of fire, and prohibitory insurance rates. Held, demurrer
sustained. Allegations do not show that filling station will be so
erected or operated as to be a nuisance in fact. Thompson v. Texas
Co., 143 S. E. 376 (Ga., 1928).
There have been three lines of resistance against the intrusion of
filling stations into residential districts. Their erection has been
enjoined because of the violation of a zoning ordinance 1 and because
of an applicable restrictive covenant against the location of business
enterprises. 2 The question in such cases has been whether the station came within the purview of the ordinance or deed and courts
have not had to consider whether it was or would be properly
conducted.
In the absence of these two grounds the neighbors have been
forced to rely upon the doctrine of nuisance. All cases agree that
authority to make the statement: Indemnity Co. v. Lehman, 28 F. (2d.) 1,
(C. C. A., 7th, 1928) says--".., if the act or declaration concerning which
the admission or declaration is made be in furtherance of the conspiracy, then
it may be said that the admission is in furtherance of the conspiracy." Cf.
Miller v. Eaglestar and Brit. Dom. Ins. Co., 143 S. E. 692 (S. C., June 11,
1928) (insurance agent's statement at maturity of policy re knowledge at
issuance of policy admissible).
'Accord: Hildebrand v. United Artisans, 46 Ore. 134, 91 Pac. 592 (1907).
Contra: McComb v. R. R., supra note 1. [The statement of the station agent
to the shipper of goods, about the goods left at the station, was clearly within
the scope of his agency and authority, but the court, erroneously it is believed,
held that such a statement, to be admissible, must have been made as part of
the transaction referred to. This the source of the numerous dicta to the
same effect since 1874 by North Carolina courts.]
'Long v. Scott, 133 At. 767 (N. J. L., 1926); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Wright, 124 Okla. 55, 254 Pac. 41 (1927).
, Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244, 112 Atl. 236 (1920) ; Weiss v. Jack,
236 Mich. 490, 211 N. W. 90 (1927).
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a properly conducted garage or filling station is not a nuisance per
se.8 Automobiles are of such general use that public garages and
supply stations are essential and cannot well be dispensed with.4
But a filling station may become a nuisance in fact.5
Do the normal attributes of a filling station render it a nuisance
if located in a residential district or must it be improperly conducted
or erected ?
Where business enterprises have substantially changed the residential character of a district, courts will not enjoin a filling station
merely because of its location. 6 Even in exclusively residential sections, however, the majority holding is that an alleged threat of
depreciation in value of property, increase in the fire hazard and
insurance rates, and even the judicially known discomforts from the
ordinary noise and odors caused by filling stations are not enough
to render the proposed operation a nuisance. 7 Thus the Georgia
court, while refusing either to go quite as far as an earlier court
which said, 'We know of no sound, however discordant, that may
not, by habit, be converted into a lullaby, except the braying of an
ass or the tongue of a scold," 8 or to agree with the Oklahoma court
which protected a plaintiff against "the ejactulations of the most
ubiquitous of automobiles," nevertheless held filling-station noises
insufficient to invoke relief. Something more than the ordinary
evils of a filling station are necessary.9
One reason why the mere construction of a gasoline filling station is not more generally enjoined as a nuisance is that the manner
in which it will be conducted cannot be foreseen. 10 To enjoin a,
Wasilewski v. Bredrzycki, 180 Wis. 633, 192 N. W. 989 (1923); Mitchell

v. Guaranty Co., 283 Pa. 361, 229 Adt. 114 (1925); Hanes v. Car. Cadillac Co.,
176 N. C. 350, 97 S. E. 162 (1918) ; (1928) 26 Micu. L. REv. 941.
'Hanes v. Car. Cadillac Co., supra note 3, at 351, 97 S. E. at 162; Nevins
v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925).
'See note 3.

'Lansing v. Perry, 216 Mich. 23, 184 N. W. 473; see Lewis v. Burney,
230 S. W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921); Hunter v. Wood, 277 Pa. 250, 120 Atl.
781 (1923).
'Brown v. Easterday, 110 Neb. 729, 194 N. W. 789 (1923); Bourgeios v.
Miller, 80 N. J. Eq. 285, 104 At. 388 (1918); Nevins v. McGavock, supra
note 4; Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 141 S. E. 643 (Ga., 1928); Hanes v. Car.
Cadillac Co., supra note 4.
'Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 141 S. E. 643, 645.
'McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church of Woodward, 120 Okla. 40,
248 Pac.
561 (1926).
"0White v. Gulf Refining Co., 2 S. W. (2d.) 414 (Tenn., 1928) ; Sherman v.
Levingston, 128 N. Y. S. 581 (1910); Bourgeois v. Miller, supra note 7.
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threatened nuisance it must appear that the injury complained of
would be irreparable in damages and that there is a clear and reasonable probability that the injury will be done."1
In at least one case, however, the operation of an established
filling station on a corner in a residential section was enjoined as a
nuisance in fact because the headlights of cars being served came
into plaintiff's home, destroying his privacy and sleep. 12 Similarly,
the maintenance in a residence district of a double row of storage garages for twenty cars, facing each other on a fifty foot lot with a
driveway of fourteen and one-half feet, was enjoined as a nuisance
because of the noise, fumes, and depreciation in value of the surrounding property.' 3 And several courts have enjoined proposed
filling stations in residential sections, simply because their inherent
14
attributes make them a nuisance there.
It. is probable that the trend of the authorities will be increasingly
in the direction of the cases last cited.
S. SHARP.
INSURANcE--CoNbITIoNAL SALES---'SoLE AND UNCONDITIONAL
CLAUsE-In Cook v. Citizens' Insurance Company of
Missouri, 143 S. E. 113 (W. Va., 1928) the plaintiff was the buyer
of store fixtures under a conditional sale, the title to remain in the
vendor until the price was paid. The plaintiff insured his interest
against fire under a policy issued by the defendant which was to be
void if the insured's interest be other than "sole and unconditional
ownership." At the time of the fire, $260 remained unpaid. Held,
judgment for the plaintiff affirmed.
It is well settled that the buyer of a chattel in possession under
OwNERSHIP"

' Polish Political Club v. Cloper, 157 N. E. 705 (Mass., 1927); see McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church of Woodward, supra note 9; note (1923)
26 A. L. R. 937.
' Nat'l Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388 (1924); note
(1924) 35 A. L. R. 95.
'George v. Goodovich, 288 Pa. 48, 135 Atl. 719 (1927); note (1927) 50
A. L. R. 107.
" Mitchell v. Guaranty Co., 283 Pa. 361, 129 Atl. 114 (1925), residential
section containing one small store, two churches and a school; Slingluff v.
Tyson, 280 Pa. 206, 124 AtL 420 (1924), highest class residential section in
town; Huddelson v. Burnett, 172 Ark. 216, 287 S. W. 1013 (1926), residential
section; McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, supra note 9, across street
from church; but see Texas Co. v. Brandt, 79 Okla. 97, 191 Pac. 166 (1920) ;
Lewis v. Burney, 230 S. W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921) ; cf. Marshall v. City
of Dallas, 253 S. W. 887 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923).
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a conditional sale contract has an insurable interest.1 He has all
the beneficial elements of ownership in proportion to his payments
except bare legal title.2 The vendor cannot refuse to convey title
when paid in full ;3 on that occasion the title automatically passes.4
The buyer has a property right which he can sell,5 or assign,O or
mortgage, 7 and which can, subject to the protection of the vendor's
rights by recording acts or otherwise, 8 be reached by the buyer's
creditors. 9
The weight of authority sustains the view that, in the absence of
a contract to the contrary, the buyer has the risk of loss. 10 Indeed,
this is now statutory in those states which have adopted the Uniform
Conditional Sales Law."
What, then, is the effect of a clause in a fire insurance policy
issued to the buyer rendering it void if the insured's interest is not
"sole and unconditional ownership ?" The purpose of the clause, as
used in the standard policy, seems to have been to prevent overinsurance, that is, to prevent recovery of full insurance by one bearing only a part of the loss. 1 2 Nevertheless, the courts are divided.
The majority, having regard more for the technical state of legal
title, hold that, until final payment has been made, the interest of the
buyer does not satisfy the requirements of the clause, and that, if
loss occurs, the insurer is not liable.'8 The minority, more con'BoGERT,

COMMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES

(1924), §32.

'Phenix Insurance Co. v. Hilliord et al, 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799 (1910).

'Tuffs v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E. 68, 10 L. R. A. 526, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 868 (1890). Cases collected, BOGERT, §18.
'Ameriean Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughn, 69 N. 3. L. 582, 55 Atl. 54
(1903); BOGERT, §27.
'Petton Waterwheel Co. v. Oregon Iron Co., 87 Ore. 248, 170 Pac. 317
(1918).
'Duante v. Minick, 87 Wash. 539, 148 Pac. 600 (1915); BoaEr, §21.
"Karalis v. Agnew, 111 Minn. 522, 127 N. W. 440 (1910); BOGERT, supra
note8 6.
C. S. 3312.
'Commercial Investment Trust v. Albemarle Motor Co., Stanly Bank and
Trust Co., and A. P. Harris, Trustee, 193 N. C.663, 137 S. E. 874 (1927).
" Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 120, 58 S. E. 909 (1907);
Tuffs v. Griffin, supra note 3; note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 1319; WLLiSTON,
SALES, §304.
' UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, Vol. 2, §27. "After delivery of the goods to
the buyer, and prior to the retaking of them by the seller, the risk of injury
and loss shall fall upon the buyer."
West Virginia has adopted this section. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923) c. 99-A §27. N. C. has not adopted this statute.
' RIcH.RDs, INSURANCE, 3 ed., p. 355.
=Virginia Fire and M. Ins. Co. v. Lennon, 140 Va. 766, 125 S. E. 801

(1924) ; note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 186; COOLEY,
2199 (1925) ; 11 VA. L. RE. 313.

BRIEFS ON INSURANCE,

2 ed., p.
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cerned with risk of loss than the question of title, protect the buyer
unless it appears, either as between the buyer and the seller or between the buyer and a third person, that the buyer is not to stand
the entire loss. Aided by a canon of construction of the policy in
favor of the insured, these courts regard the buyer, if not in default,
as "the beneficial owner."'14 The same diversity of views characterizes the application of the clause to the interest of the vendor. 15
It is submitted that the minority view, which is law in North
Carolina, is the more desirable under modern instalment buying conditions.'
Otherwise, when an insurance company issues a policy
containing such a clause, with knowledge of the facts, to a buyer
under a conditional sale, it says, in effect, "You are buying insurance
to become effective only after you have acquired the full title upon
final payment."' 17 This is not the bargain.

N. S. SowERs.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FiXING RATEs FOR

legislature of New Jersey passed an
act' giving the Commissioner of Labor power to fix the maximum
rates which an employment agency could charge for its service. The
Supreme Court of the United States held this statute to be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.2 The court admitted that a state had the power to
require a license and to regulate the business of an employment
agency 8 but declared that employment agencies were not so affected
with a public interest as to allow rate fixation. 4
"'Lancaster v. Ins. Co., 153 N. C. 285, 69 S.E. 214, 138 Am. St. Rep. 665
(1910) ; Simms v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 296 Fed. 115 (1924) ; note (1925)
38 A. L. R. 200; VANcE, INsuRANcE, c. 12, p. 444.
' Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 204.
"In Lancaster v. Ins. Co., supra note 14, at page 290, the court, after statEmPLOYMENT AGENCIES-The

ing the familiar principles that in a conditional sales agreement risk of loss is
on the vendee, added: "From this we think it follows that, by analogy to the
position obtaining in case of real estate, that the vendee under the facts existant here, is unconditional and sole owner of the goods, within the meaning
of the contract and there has been no breach of the same in this respect." See
Harden v. Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 423, 127 S. E. 353 (1925).
' Some courts meet this by saying that in such a situation, the insurer
waives its privileges under the clause. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael et ux,
74 N. E. 964 (Ind., 1905).
P. L., N. J., 1918, p. 822.
'Ribnik v. McBride, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1928).
' Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 36 S. Ct 662 (1916) ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 S. Ct. 662 (1917) ; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 43
S. Ct. 66, (Ga., 1900).
'Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 2, p. 545.
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Businesses affected with a public interest may be classified as
follows: (1) those carried on under a public grant, imposing a duty
of public service; (2) exceptional occupations, recognized from
earliest times; and (3) businesses which, though not public at their
inception, have risen to be such.5 In deciding the instant case it is
necessary to examine the rules laid down in cases belonging to the
third class.0 There is no well-defined test for determining when a
business has become clothed with a public interest. 7 The court found
the facts of this case to be analagous to those of a recent New York
case8 where the legislature attempted to fix the maximum fee that a
ticket broker could charge for the resale of theatre tickets. That
statute was held to be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court declaring that the businesses of the broker, the baker,
the butcher, and the wood-chopper had never been clothed with a
public intirest. The business must be such "as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby,
in effect, granted to the public."9
The dissenting justices in Ribnik v. McBride' o argue that occupations are affected with a public interest "whenever any combination
of circumstances seriously curtails the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in
the bargaining struggle that a legislature might reasonably anticipate
serious consequences to the community as a whole."' 1 They then
offer abundant authority to the effect that employment agencies are
afflicted with evils, which are causing serious consequences in many
communities; and they then assert that price regulation is the only
'Classification of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Wolff v. Industrial Court,
262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (Kan., 1923).
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1870) ; Budd v. New York,
143 U. S. 517, 12 S. Ct. 468 (1892) ; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,

233 U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612 (Kan., 1914) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41

S. Ct. 458 (Dist. of Col., 1921) ; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13
22 S. Ct. 1 (Tenn., 1901); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 S. Ct. 206

(1909).
"Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426 (N. Y., 1926);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (Dist. of Col.,
1922).

'Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, supra note 7.
'It is clear that the court is using a fiction because there is no actual grant
by private concerns to the public. See Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, .supra note 7,

9. 438
(47 S. Ct. 431); Freund, PoLIcE PowER, §372, p. 381.
0

' Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 2.
Ribnik v. McBride, idem. p. 547; American Coal Mining Co. v. Special
Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, 268 Fed. 563 (1920) ; Freund, POLI E

POWER, §388; 35 YALE L. J. 438; 19 MicH. L. REv. 74, 415.
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kind that will remedy those evils.' 2 They further argue that this
case is more in line with Munn v. Illinois'3 than with Tyson v. Banton. 14 Finally, they show, by a long line of decisions, that the court
has from time to time widened the range of businesses affected with
a public interest and argue that employment agencies should also be
included.
This case raises the broad question of the expediency of governmental interference with private business. The constitutionality of
state interference, in fixing rates under certain circumstances, was
first established in Munn v. Illinois,15 in 1870, where the State of
Illinois was allowed to convert all the grain elevators into public
utilities and to regulate the storage charges for grain. Since then,
because of the growing complexity of our economic life, other situations have occurred which give rise to circumstances justifying
state interference. We think the real issue of the case is: Have
employment agencies grown to the stage where their evils make
necessary governmental price regulation to protect the interests of
the public? We are not in a position to know the actual conditions
of employment agencies but the fact that in addition to New Jersey
twenty-one states 16 have limited the fees that may be charged is a
strong indication that there is a need for price regulation in the
industrialized State of New Jersey. The result of the case in question is to permit the state to regulate all, features of the business
except those seeming to demand regulation. If it is constitutional
for a state to regulate at all, it should be constitutional for a state
to regulate those parts of a business which demand it.

J.
PUBLIC

UTILITIES-INTERSTATE

FRAzIER GLENN, JR.

COMMERCE--STATE

TAX

ON

Bend,
Indiana, city ordinance prohibited the operation on its streets of any
motor bus, unless licensed by the city. The ordinance prescribed
INTERSTATE BUSES AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN-A South

"There are evils common to employment agencies other than those affecting the fees. Adams v. Tanner, supra note 3, pp. 597-616 (244 U. S. 590),
but it is obvious in a business where the chief source of income is from the
collection of fees that there will be numerous evils occurring in their collection,
such as, excessive fees, discriminatory fees, and fee-splitting with the employer.
See Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 2, p. 549.
1
Supra note 6.

& Bro. v. Banton, supra note 7.
Munn v. Illinois, supra note 6 .
Ribnik v. McBride, supra note 2, p. 551, footnote 15.

4Tyson
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license fees varying with the seating capacity of the bus; that for a
bus with seats for twelve persons was fifty dollars a year. No distinction was made between buses engaged exclusively in interstate,
in partly interstate and partly intrastate, or exclusively in intrastate
traffic. The defendant operated a bus from South Bend to Niles,
Michigan, a distance of about nine miles, and though his business
was primarily interstate, he served suburban traffic to points within
the state, but required all passengers to pay the fare to some Michigan point. The defendant refused to apply for a license from the
city and was convicted of a violation of the ordinance. Held, the
conviction was error. The ordinance was void for the imposition of
the license fee, it being a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Sprout v. City of South Bend, 48 Sup. Ct. 502
(1928).
The instant case is another illustration of the constantly recurring attempts of bus companies to evade state regulation by the use
of various tricks and subterfuges. A somewhat analogous situation
arose in the case of Inter-City Coach Co. v. Atwood,' where the bus
company ran its line from a point in the state just across the state
line and back to points within the same state, the crossing of the
state line being merely an attempt to make the traffic interstate.2 In
the principal case, the ticket was sold to a point in another state,
which made it, on its face, an interstate transaction, since the passenger had a contract right against the bus company for an interstate
transportation; when in fact, the passengers, with the knowledge of
the operator, were only going to a point within the state. The court
held that this part of the bus line's operations was intrastate, the test
being the actual nature of the transaction. Though the present case
is clearer than thd Atwood case, both are difficult to reconcile with
the Supreme Court holdings that where there is transportation between termini in the same state, over a route lying partly outside
121 F. (2d.) 83 (1927); commented on in 41

HARv.

L. REa.

260; 6 N.

C. L. REv. 208; 26 MIcH. L. REv. 222; see also, Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. v.
Settle, 260 U. S. 166, 43 Sup. Ct. 28 (1922) ; Crigler v. Comm., 120 Ky. 517,
87 S. W. 276; Interstate Buses Corporation v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U. S.
45, 47 S. Ct. 298.

In the Atwood case, the court spoke of such attempts at evasion as "increditable subterfuges" and "mere fictions of interstate commerce," and that
interstate commerce must include something more than running buses across
state lines. Such evasions are frequently attempted; for instance, see press
report in the Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Thursday, Oct. 11, 1928.
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of the state, the commerce is interstate3 and the intention of evading
the application of local regulation should not change the character
of the transportation, since whether a given transaction is interstate
is solely a question of fact.4 It is safe to say, however, that when
such devices and tricks are used to avoid local regulation, it will be
of no avail, even though the buses cross the state lines.
This question, however, was of no importance in the principal
case, it being admitted that the business of the bus company was
primarily interstate, and though it was also engaged in intrastate
traffic, the statute imposed a privilege tax upon all buses without
distinction between whether they were engaged exclusively in interstate, partly in interstate and partly in intrastate, or exclusively in

intrastate traffic; consequently, it was void.5
Interstate bus transportation is, in the absence of action by Congress, the proper subject of local regulation, provided the regulation
is reasonable and does not constitute a direct or material burden on
interstate commerce. 6 Accordingly, the states may impose upon
interstate bus lines, undiscriminatory regulations for the purpose of
insuring the public safety and convenience, and may require a license
for this purpose ;7 they may also impose upon such vehicles a reasonable charge for the maintenance and repair of the highways.8 On
'Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry., 187 U. S. 617, 23 Sup. Ct 214 (1903);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17 (1920); cf. Lehigh Valley
R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192 (1892) ; Ewing v. City of Leavenworth,
226 U. S. 464 (1913). See 6 HAv. L. REv. 457 (1913).
'Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 35 S. Ct. 419 (1915) ; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Speight, supra note 3. See 73 U. of PA. L. REv. 210.
'Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324 (1925) ; Bush v. Maloy,
267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct 326, 327 (1925) ; Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall,
8 F. (2d.) 635 (1926).
"Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S., 1851); Hendrick v.
Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1914).
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916) ; Hendrick v.
Maryland, supra note 6.
S Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1926) ; Interstate Buses Corp. v. Blodgett,
48 Sup. Ct. 230 (1928). This type of regulation allowed the states is an
exercise of the states' police power as that term is used in its primary sense,
i.e., "measures of police" (FREUND, POLICE POWER, §70), in that it concerns
itself with the primary social interests: safety, order, and morals; in contradistinction to "measures of revenue," which deal with economic interests:
rates, service, and limitations or prohibitions of competition. The latter type
will not be upheld unless the matter is of local concern not requiring uniform
legislation. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 252 U. S. 23 (1920)
(upheld); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1913) (overthrown).
The cases cited are in the public utility field. It seems that regulations of
rates and service have not been attempted in the bus field as yet, though discriminatory restrictions and prohibitions of competition have been attempted
and condemned. Buck v. Kuykendall, supra note 5.

86

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

the other hand, if the provisions of the statute have no reasonable
connection with these interests, it will not be upheld; consequently,
interstate bus operators may not be required to provide insurance, 9
or indemnity bonds.' 0 Likewise, if it unduly burdens, obstructs and
a fortiori,if it prohibits such traffic, it is obnoxious to the Commerce
Clause, and is void." The Supreme Court has allowed the states
a good deal of freedom in this regard. As a result, a wide range of
state statutes have been upheld. The instant case is significant in
that it indicates that the court, in the face of its recent attitude, has
not retreated from its position that a statute which prohibits interstate commerce is invalid.
R. T. GILES.
PROCEDUE-EXECUTION AGAINST THE PERSON-It is provided

by statute in North Carolina, as follows:
"If the action is one in which the defendant might have been arrested, an execution against the person may be issued to any county
in the state, after a return of an execution against the property
wholly or partly unsatisfied. But no execution shall issue against
the person of the judgment debtor, unless an order of arrest has
been served, as provided in the article Arrest and Bail, or unless
the complaint contains a statement of facts showing one or more of
the causes of arrest required by law, whether such statement of facts
is necessary to the cause of action or not."'
Referring to the article Arrest and Bail 2 it is provided that there are
five cases in which arrest is allowed: (1) In an action for damages
not arising out of contract where the defendant is not a resident of
the state or where he is about to remove from the state or where
the injury is to the person or character or for injuring or wrongfully taking and detaining property; (2) in an action for a fine or
penalty, for seduction, for money received, embezzlement by any
fiduciary or person acting in that capacity, or for any misconduct in
office or professional employment; (3) for the concealment of per-

sonal property in an action for its possession where it has been concealed with the intent that it should not be found or with the intent
to deprive the plaintiff of'the benefit thereof; (4) for fraud in in*Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall, supra, note 5.
"Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1924),
"Buck v. Kuykendall; supra note 5.
1C. S. 673.

2C. S. 768.
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curring a debt; and (5) when the defendant has removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud
his creditors.
It will be seen that it is necessary for an execution against the
person that there be an order of arrest served beforehand or there
must be a statement of facts in the complaint which would justify
an arrest, whether such statement be necessary for the cause of
action or not. In this regard the court has laid down three classes
of cases. 3 In the first class there has been an arrest of the defendant
under proper application. In the second class the cause of arrest is
set forth in the complaint but is collateral and extrinsic to the plaintiff's cause of action. The third class is where the cause of arrest
is set forth in the complaint and is necessary to and part of the
whole of the plaintiff's cause of action.3 1 In this instance no order
of arrest is required but the complaint must state sources of information and must be verified.
As to verification of the complaint there seems to be some doubt.
It seems that the need of verification arose when the statement of
facts in the complaint was to be used as an affidavit for arrest, that
is, the second or third class referred to above. It would seem that
the need of verification has been eliminated by the fact that the jury
must pass upon the issue, but although there is no direct holding on
this point the cases seem to imply that the complaint must be
4
verified.
The cause for arrest set forth in the complaint must be found
by the jury.5 It is not sufficient that there is a verified complaint
setting forth the cause for arrest. There must be submitted to the
jury an issue on the cause of action and also the cause for arrest
and these must be found in the affirmative. When the facts alleged
are in relation to an injury the jury must find still further that the
injury was done wilfully-that is, voluntarily and of set purpose, or
'Peebles v. Foote, 83 N. C. 102 (1880).
14 Harris v. Singletary, 193 N. C. 583, 137 S. E. 724 (1927).
"Huntley v. Hasty, 132 N. C. 279, 43 S. E. 844 (1903) ; Carroll v. Montgomery, 128 N. C. 278, 38 S. E. 874 (1901).
'Ledford v. Emerson, 143 N. C. 527, 55 S. E. 969 (1906) ; Turlington v.
Aman, 163 N. C. 555, 79 S. E. 1102 (1913) ; Michael v. Leach, 166 N. C. 223,
81 S. E. 1135 (1914) ; Doyle v. Bush, 171 N. C. 10, 86 S. E. 165 (1915) ; Oakley
v. Lasater, 172 N. C. 96, 89 S. E. 1063 (1916).
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of free will, without yielding to reason, 6 or with some element of
violence, fraud, or criminality.7
The cause for arrest having been determined by the jury the
question of judgment arises. Some of the cases say that it is necessary that the judgment should direct that an execution against the
person be issued because the execution must follow the judgment
since its purpose is to enforce it.s Other cases say that it is not
necessary that the judgment contain such matter.9 The latter view
appears to be the more reasonable one for an execution against the
person follows naturally, the facts having been found by the jury
and stated in the judgment, 10 after an execution against the property
of the judgment debtor has been returned unsatisfied.
ANDREW C. MCINTOSH.

PROPERTY-DEEDS-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-Is AN
APARTMENT HOUSE A DWELLING HOUSE ?-Building restrictions in a
REAL

deed provided that the lot thereby conveyed should "be used for residential purposes only" and that there should "not at any time be more
than one residence or dwelling house on said lot." Held, that the
restrictions were not violated by the erection of a four-family apartment house on the lot.' All of the relevant North Carolina cases
were cited in the opinion. Of these the two recent decisions that
restrictions prohibiting the erection of more than "one residence" on
a lot exclude apartment houses 2 and that restrictions limiting the
use of the property to "residence purposes only" do not exclude
apartment houses3 are well-accepted propositions. 4 And it may be
'McKinney v. Patterson, 174 N. C. 483, 93 S. E. 967 (1917).

Oakley v. Lasater, 172 N. C. 96, 89 S. E. 1063 (1916) ; Overton v. Combs,
182 N. C. 4, 108 S. E. 357 (1921).

'Ledford v. Emerson, 143 N. C. 527, 55 S. E. 969 (1906).
'Turlington v. Aman, 163 N. C. 555, 79 S. E. 1102 (1913); Michael v.
Leach, 166 N. C. 223, 81 S. E. 1135 (1914).
"Doyle v. Bush, 171 N. C. 10, 86 S. E. 165 (1915).
'Charlotte Cons. Construction Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C. 690, 143 S. E. 522

(1928).
*'Bailey v. Jackson, 191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1925).

'Huntington v. Dennis, 195 N. C. 759, 143 S. E. 521 (1928). In this case
it was held further that the erection of an eight-family apartment house at a
cost of $28,000 would not be a violation of a provision that any residence
erected on the property should cost not less than $7,500. The provision itself
suggests that the erection of an apatrment house was not anticipated. Thus
the provision did not cover the case of an apartment house but only that of
an ordinary single-family residence.
'Courtney v. Hunter, 159 Ga. 332, 125 S.-E. 714 (1924) ; Teagan v. Keywell, 212 Mich. 649, 180 N. W. 454 (1920); Arnoff v. Williams, 94 Ohio St.
85, 113 N. E. 661 (1916).
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asserted generally that the court's problem of construction arises only
where the terms of the restrictions do not clearly indicate whether
erections are limited generally to any sort of abode or particularly
to one kind of abode.5 The singular of "dwelling" or "dwelling
house" is in the twilight zone.8 Where no buildings "other than a
dwelling house" may be erected on a lot, the Michigan court would
hold the erection of an apartment house a violation of the restrictions.7 North Carolina8 has followed Illinois 9 and Pennsylvania'0
in adopting the contrary construction. In the present case erections
were limited to "one residence or dwelling house." The court, conceding that an apartment house might be more than one residence,
denied that it was more than one dwelling house or that "residence"
and "dwelling house" were used synonymously. It is conceivable
that the draftsman and the parties did not regard the latter term
as broader than the former. If it was broader the former was mere
surplusage. But the court has spoken and effected a result quite
in keeping with the policy in favor of the free use of property. Because of the increasing use of apartments in the cities for "residential purposes" and the fact of their erection in the better residential areas it would not be unwise for the draftsman of building
restrictions who would limit erections to one particular sort of abode
tb the exclusion of others to say so in explicit terms. The safer
way is to set forth what structures are excluded rather than those
only which may be erected.

J. B. FoRHXAM.
'Where structures -were limited to "one house only on each lot" it was
taken as clear that single-family houses only were permitted. Arnoff v.
Chase, 101 Ohio St. 331, 128 N. E. 319 (1920). And the same view is taken
as to restrictions limiting buildings to private dwellings. Taylor v. Lambert,
279 Pa. 514, 124 A. 169 (1924); Walker v. Haslett, 44 Cal. App. 394, 186 P.
622 (1920).
' The Ohio court has frankly said that restrictions limiting erections to
"one dwelling" are capable of two constructions, viz. that only one building
could be erected or that only one family house could be erected. Frederick
v. Hay, 104 Ohio St. 292, 135 N. E. 535 (1922). Where the plural of "dwelling" or "dwelling house" has been used the tendency is to hold apartment
houses not excluded. Ministers, etc. R. P. Dutch Church v. Madison Ave.
Bldg. Co., 214 N. Y. 268, 108 N. E. 444 (1915).
Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647, 139 N. W. 878 (1913); Thompson v.
Langan, 172 Mo. App. 64, 154 S. W. 808 (1913).
"De Laney v. Van Ness, 193 .N. C. 721, 138 S. E. 28 (1927).
'Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 Ill. 336, 34 N. E. 556 (1893).
10
Rohrer v. Real Estate Co., 259 Pa. 297, 102 A. 1050 (1918).
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TORTS-DECEIT-RELIANCE ON REPRESENTATION-NEGLIGENCE

AS TEST-An agent authorized to sell land visited the property with

the prospective purchaser. He pointed out its boundaries when threequarters of a mile away and admitted that he had never been on the
locus in quo until the day before. Afterwards, the purchaser had
ample opportunity to investigate. Held that the misrepresentation
was an honest mistake, and as the purchaser could have easily ascertained the truth, he should not have relied solely on the statement. 1
The court in laying down the elements of actionable fraud said, "It
(the representation) must be reasonably relied on by the other
party." Evidently it concluded that here the reliance was entirely
unreasonable. The result is correct, but the decision could have
been based on the sole ground that the representation was an honest
mistake. It is doubtful whether a duty of due care should be imposed on the plaintiff in actions of deceit. Rather the test should be
whether the deceived actually relied, using the standard of reasonable diligence to ascertain whether as a matter of fact, reliance was
placed on the representation or whether the defrauded party acted
from his own beliefs and without regard for the statements.
The problem is well stated in a Kentucky case 2 which holds that,
"The policy of the courts is, on the one hand, to suppress fraud,
and on the other hand, not to encourage negligence and inattention
to one's own interests . . . is it better to encourage negligence in
the foolish, or fraud in the deceitful?" It is apparent that there is
danger in either course, but the same case concluded that, "Judicial
experience shows the former to be less objectionable., The law is
not designed to protect the vigilant, or tolerably vigilant alone, although it rather favors them, but is intended as a protection to even
the foolishly credulous, as against the machinations of the designedly wicked."
The weight of authority holds that ordinarily false representations are not actionable unless the hearer relies thereon while exercising common prudence and diligence.8 However, courts have
shown an increasing tendency to get away from the injustice caused
at times by this rule, by including as "reasonable reliance" conduct
4
which was in former cases held to be negligent.
'Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C. 685, 143 S. E. 525 (1928).
'Western Mfg. v. Cotton, 126 Ky. 749, 104 S. W. 758 (1907).
'Cooley on Torts, Vol. 2, 3 ed., p. 931; 26 C. J. 1142.
"Aultman Machine Co. v. Schierkolh, 95 Kan. 737, 149 Pac. 680 (1915).
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The early cases take the view that where the victim had opportunities to investigate and through lack of due care did not do so,
the blame was on himself and he could not recover, 5 even though
the representor made positive statements and was in a position to
know the truth, 6 as a statement concerning quantity of land, 7 or its
boundaries,8 or that a note was for a certain amount.9
While these principles have been upheld in later decisions, 10
many of the cases have been modified.1 1 Numerous cases now hold
that one may rely on a representation without an investigation: (1)
where statements are a matter of knowledge of the person making
them or are matters which from their nature and situation are
peculiarly within his power of knowledge;12 (2) where representor
makes positive statements fraudulently ;13 (3) and where there is a
confidential relation existing between the parties. 14 So it was held
reasonable to rely on the statement of owner of land as to its boundaries 15 and to representations by insurance agent to blind man concerning terms of the policy.1 6
"The tendency of modern decisions is not to extend but to restrict the rule requiring diligence.""' 7 One court boldly proclaims,
"The liability of vendor arises from his own fraud and is not affected
by the question of diligence on the part of the vendee."' 8 Further,
a number of cases hold that the sole question is whether the repre'Saunders v. Hatterman, 24 N. C. 32 (1841) ; Lytle v. Bird, 48 N. C. 223
(1854).
'Credle v. Swindell, 63 N. C. 305 (1868).
Fagan v. Newson, 12 N. C. 20 (1826).
"Lytle v. Bird, supra.
'Fields v. Rouse, 48 N. C. 72 (1855).
"' Cash Register Co. v. Townshend, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306 (1905);
Conley v. Coffin, 115 N. C. 563, 20 S.E. 207 (1894).
'Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233 (1871) ; May v. Loomis, 140 N. C. 350, 52
S. E. 728 (1905).
"Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155 N. C. 63, 71 S.E. 61 (1911).
"Machine Co. v. Bullock, 161 N. C. 1, 76 S. E. 634 (1912); Shell v. Roseman, 155 N. C. 90, 71 S.E. 86 (1910).
14 Ripy v. Cronen, 131 Ky. 631, 115 S. W. 791 (1909).
Stout v. Martin, 87 W. Va. 1, 104 S.E. 157 (1920).
Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908).
Also held reasonable to rely on statements as to conditions of mill machinery
and quantity of merchantable timber. May v. Loomis, 140 N. C. 350, 52 S. E.
728 (1905) ; and on representation as to amount of business done although the
books were placed at buyer's disposal. Smith v. Werkheiser, 152 Mich. 177,
115 N. W. 964 (1908).
"' Kraus v. Commerce National Bank, 140 Minn. 108, 167 N. W. 353 (1918).
"Hale v. Philbrick, 42 Iowa 81 (1875).
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sentation deceived the person involved. 19 "That is the real question
and not whether the defrauded one was reasonably diligent." 20
LAWRENCE WALLACE.

TORTS-PRoxIMATE CAUSE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-JOINT TORT-

FEAsORs-In a recent North Carolina case,1 the plaintiff's intestate
was electrocuted. A car was shunted off the end of a spur track
belonging to defendant railroad. It struck a guy-rope which supported a pole belonging to defendant power company. This pole
was within the right-of-way of the railroad. The force of the blow
injured a transformer attached to the pole. The intestate was employed in a laundry which was supplied with electric current by the
power company. In the course of his ordinary duties, he grasped
a switch and was killed by the excessive current produced by the
injury to the transformer. The power company was negligent in
not having inspected its wires. The railroad company was negligent,
first, in having permitted the pole to be placed within its right-ofway and, second, in shunting the car off the end of the track. In
the lower court, the plaintiff recovered damages from both of the
defendants and this was affirmed on appeal.
The causal connection is clear. The negligence of defendants is
concurrent. That there can be more than one proximate cause for
an injury, even though these causes are not concurrent, is well set" Bowee v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 106 N. W. 1074 (1906).
"Halsell v. First National Bank of Muskogee, 48 Okla. 535, 150 Pac. 489
(1915); Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W. 979 (1908); Fargo Gas and
Coke Co. v. Fargo Gas and Electric Co., 4 N. D. 219, 59 N. W. 1066 (1894),
holding that "the unmistakeable drift is toward the just doctrine that the wrong
doer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the
credulity of his victim. General rule is that the question is one of reliance by
the buyer wpon the false statements of the seller and whether he was prudent
or negligent is immaterial." See BIGELOW on ToRTs, 524.
In a North Carolina case, Pittman v. Tobacco Grower's Coaperative Ass'n.,
187 N. C. 340, 121 S. E. 364 (1924), plaintiff signed a contract to join the
defendant co6perative association and was an active worker in interesting
others. He passed out a number of contracts, asked people to read them and
join, but he did not read the contract himself. Later he sued for fraudulent
representations in the contract as to number of members previously signed.
The court held the reliance was not reasonable. It is suggested that the court
should have considered the case as one where no reliance was placed on the
terms of the contract at all, since he neither read the contract nor made any
inquiries, but probably desired to repudiate the contract for other reasons.
Thus his failure to use due care is evidence that he signed the contract independently of any reliance upon its terms.
'Ramsay v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. and Louisville and Nashville
Railroad, 195 N. C. 788, 143 S. E. 861 (1928).

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
tled.2 The question of proximate cause has been "hashed" by the
courts for a long while. In most cases in which the question has
arisen, there is a clear casual connection, as in the instant case, but
the question actually decided by the courts in these cases, under the
guise of proximate cause, is whether the interest of the plaintiff is
protected by the rule of law which the defendant violated.3
Another question is whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies. The principal case holds that it does. The North Carolina
cases seem to lean in this direction. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was held to apply to the electrocution of an employee of a foundry
who came in contact with an overcharged wire, 4 to a permanent
injury sustained when attempting to turn on an electric light.5 And
the court indicated that the doctrine would apply in the case of a boy
who was injured by touching an uninsulated wire while climbing a
tree. 6 In other jurisdictions there are similar cases where the rule
was similarly applied, to injuries received while using a telephone 7
and while turning on an electric light. 8 There is every reason for
holding that this rule is applicable in such cases, because, when a
company uses such a dangerous instrumentality as electricity, the
burden of going forward with the evidence should be placed upon
its shoulders. The application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur does
not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proof, but simply entitles
the jury to infer negligence from the plaintiff's evidence. 9
As to suing two defendants jointly in such cases, it has been
well decided that when two defendants have contributed to an injury,
both may be held liable, especially when their negligence is concurrent. "The fact that other causes may have concurred with the
defendant's wrong in producing the injury does not relieve it of
liability; for joint tort feasors contributing to the same injury are
jointly and severally liable. When the injury is produced from two
'Horton v, Telephone Co., 141 N. C. 455, 54 S. E. 299 (1906) ; Mangum v.
R. IL,188 N. C. 689, 125 S. E. 549 (1924).
'GRE=N, THE RATIONALE OF PoximATE CAUSE, pp. 11-14.
'Houston v. Traction Co., 155 N. C. 4, 71 S. E. 21 (1911).
Shaw v. Public Service Corporation, 168 N. C. 611, 84 S. E. 1010 (1915).
'Benton v. Public Service Corporation, 165 N. C. 354, 81 S.E. 448 (1914).
Cain v. Telephone Co., 219 Mass. 504, 107 N. E. 380 (1914) ; Delahunt et
al v. United Telephone and Telegraph Co., 215 Pa. 241, 64 Atl. 515 (1906).
'Alabama City G. and A. Ry. Co. v. Appleton, 171 Ala. 324, 54 So. 638

(1911).
'Womble v. Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S.E. 493 (1904).
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causes operating together, the party putting in motion one of these
is liable the same as though it were the sole cause."10
CHARLES S. MANGUM.
TRUSTS--LEASE BY TRUSTEE BEYOND DuRATIoN OF TRUST-In

a recent North Carolina case,1 a city building was devised to a trustee to collect the income therefrom, and to pay an annuity to A for
life and then the whole to B and C. Upon the death of B and C,
the trustee was directed to convey to their heirs or to a church upon
failure of heirs. Held, that the lease for thirty years executed under
the authority of the court which had jurisdiction of all parties in
esse who might take, was valid notwithstanding the lease might extend beyond the duration of the trust.
Trustees who are directed to pay income from trust property
have an implied power to lease, since income is usually derived from
2
trust property by leases.
No problem arises when the period of the trust is certain, for
ten years, for example. But when the period of the trust is uncertain, a trust for life as in the principal case, a problem arises as to
the length of time for which the trustee may lease. According to
the terms of the trust the remaindermen are entitled to take immediately upon the death of the life beneficiary. If literal effect is given
the terms it is obvious that the trustee will be hampered in making
advantageous leases; for a person knowing that his term might be
interrupted by the death of the life beneficiary might well refuse to
take a lease subject to such a contingency and certainly would not
pay as much for it. The result is that the property would be fettered in commerce and the beneficiaries would not derive a fair income. On both grounds it seems right that the court, with all parties
represented, 8 and all facts indicating that no injustice would result
to the remaindermen, should empower the trustee to make a lease
4
which may extend beyond the duration of the trust.
"oClark v. Patapsco Guano Co., 144 N. C. 64, 56 S. E. 858 (1907).
'Waddell, Trustee v. United Cigar Stores, 195 N. C. 434, 142 S. E. 585

(1928).

'2 PERRY, TRusTs (6 ed.) §528; 2 THOMPsON, PROPERTY §1094.
'Where the court has jurisdiction of all parties in esse who might take, it is
deemed to have jurisdiction over all not in esse, their interests being identical.
In re Upham, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913).
' The trustee may lease for periods not likely to extend beyond the duration
of the trust without authority of the court. Naylor v. Arnitt, I Russ & M.
501 (1830) ; Black v. Ligon, I Harper's Eq. (S. C.) 205 (1824) ; Hubbell v.
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The courts usually authorize those leases which are likely to
terminate during the trust period. In the principal case, a lease for
thirty years was authorized when the trust would terminate upon the
death of children who, under the mortuary tables, had an expectancy
of forty-four years. In another case 5 a lease for ninety-nine years
was denied where the trust would terminate twenty-one years after
the death of persons with a small expectancy.
Where there are unusual circumstances making a. lease for a
longer period extremely desirable, courts have authorized leases for
much longer periods. In a recent case 6 a lease for ninety-nine years
was authorized when the trust would terminate upon the death of a
beneficiary at that time fifty-two years of age. In another case 7 a
lease for ninety-nine years was authorized when but a few months
of the five years trust remained. In still another case 8 a lease for
the same period was authorized when the trust would end at the
death of a life beneficiary.
Whether the court authorizes a lease likely to terminate during
the trust period or whether it authorizes a much longer lease, its
decision rests upon economic grounds: the desirability of keeping the
property in commerce at its maximum productivity and affording the
life beneficiaries a fair income without doing injustice to the remaindermen.
J. N. SMITH.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REGISTRATION-MORTGAGES--PRIORBETWEEN JUNIOR MORTGAGE AND PRIOR UNREGISTERED

ITIES AS

December 2, 1924, one Brock
executed a deed to a parcel of land to one Owens in consideration of
$10,000. Contemporaneously with the delivery of the deed, Owens
delivered to the plaintiff trust company a deed of trust on the land
to secure the repayment of the money which the bank had advanced
PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE-On

Hubbell, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N. V. 512 (1907); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Van Raalte, 214 Mo. App. 172, 259 S. W. 1067 (1924) ; Sweeney v. Hagertown,
114 Md. 612, 125 Atl. 522 (1924). But upon the death of the life beneficiary
terminating the trust, the remainder of the lease executed without the authority
of the court is void. Cram v. Dietrich, 81 N. Y. S. 27 (1903) ; Standard
Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Penn. St. 474, 19 Atl. 411 (1890);
Cox v. Kinstcn Carolina Railroad and Lumber Co., 175 N. C. 299, 95 S. E. 623
(1918).
'Hubbell v. Hubbell, supra note 4.
*In re Upham, .rpra note 3.
'Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
' Marsh v. Marsh, 184 Ill. 623, 56 N. E. 306 (1900).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

96

Owens with which to make the purchase. Pursuant to an agreement
made between Brock and Owens at the time the deed was delivered,
Owens, on December 9, 1924, executed and delivered to Brock a
deed of trust to the same premises to secure a previous indebtedness.
On December 13, Brock recorded his deed of trust. On December
15, the trust company recorded its trust deed, and on December 27
Owens recorded the deed to the land. This suit was brought by the
trust company, which had advanced Owens the purchase money, to
have its trust deed declared the first lien on the land. It was held
by the court that the deed of trust to the trust company had priority
over the one to Brock, in spite of the fact that Brock's trust deed
was first recorded.'
It is well settled that a purchase money mortgage, executed simultaneously with the deed of purchase excluded any prior claim,
mortgage, lien, judgment, or any other right arising through the
mortgagor.2
In North Carolina, this principle is applicable not
only where the vendor of the land takes back a mortgage to secure
the purchase price, but also, where a third party advances money to
the vendee to pay the purchase price, and takes back a mortgage to
secure such advances contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of the deed. 8 Both of these principles, however, are subject
to the rule that a purchase money mortgage, like any other mortgage,
must be immediately recorded, and due diligence is required of the
mortgagee in doing so. 4 It is submitted that the court did not give
proper weight to this last consideration. The court, in the instant
case, rests its decision principally upon the theory that the execution
of the deed from Brock to Owens, and the mortgage from Owens
Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Brock et al, 196 N. C. 24 (Sept. 1928).
Bunting v. Jones, 78 N. C. 242 (1877) ; Hinton v. Hicks, 156 N. C. 24, 71
S. E. 1086 (1911) ; 1 JoNEs, MORTGAGES, (8th ed.) §582; Freeman, Judgments,
2

§373.

'Weil v. Casey, 125 N. C. 356, 34 S. E. 506 (1899) ; Moring v. Dickenson,
85 N. C. 466 (1881). But see 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed.), §584 and note 59,
where the comment is made that "In some states a provision of statute, that a
mortgage for purchase money shall be preferred to any previous judgment
which may have been obtained against the purchaser, applies only to the mortgage made by the purchaser to the vendor, and not to a mortgage made to a
third person to secure the payment of money which was applied by the purchaser to the purchase money of the land.... As between the purchaser and a
third party, it is simply borrowed money. To give this provision any other
construction would be to assign and enlarge the vendor's lien without limit."
"Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N. C. 21, 25 S. E. 40 (1914); Chemical Co. v.
Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 123 S. E. 196 (1924); 1 JoNES, MORTGAGES (8th ed.),
§§582 and 584.
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to the trust company was part of one single transaction; that the
seisin of the grantee Owens was momentary only; and that the title
did not rest in him long enough for any liens to attach. Well v.
Casey,5 is cited as the authority for that principle. That case is
indisputably the settled law in this jurisdiction for the principles of
law for which it stands, but not for the proposition for which the
court has invoked it in the instant case. The Weil case is only
authority for the proposition that the lien of the purchase money
mortgagee is superior to any liens against the grantee, or against the
premises, that were docketed prior to the acquisition of the premises
by the grantee and the giving of the purchase money mortgage by
him-and no more. Nowhere in that case, nor in our books, is the
proposition advanced that the lien of the purchase money mortgage
is superior to a mortgage, executed subsequently to the acquisition
of the property, and recorded prior to the purchase money mortgage,
as are the facts here. Moreover, in the Weil case, no question is
raised as to the purchase money mortgagee failing to record his
mortgage immediately; such question seems quite pertinent here. 6
On the basis of this analysis it seems that the true doctrine of the
Weil case has been either misapprehended, or has been extended to
cover widely different facts.
The North Carolina court has distinctly held that a mortgage
given for the purchase money of land is not entitled to priority over
a junior mortgage, which is registered first, although the junior
mortgagee had notice of the prior encumbrance. 7 The court does not
cite this decision in the instant case, but it does say that "priority of
registration did not determine priority of lien under the facts admitted in the pleadings and established by the verdict." The only
essential facts admitted in the pleadings and established by the verdict in this case were that A executed a deed to B; simultaneously,
B executed a purchase money mortgage to C; subsequently, B executed a junior mortgage to A s for valuable consideration. A regis'125 N. C. 356, 34 S. E. 506 (1899).

'The same distinguishing features will apply to the cases of Moring v.

Dickinson, supra and Bunting v. Jones, supra, upon which the decision in the
Weil case is based, as well as to the case of Hinton v. Hicks, supra.
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99 (1893).
'The fact that A, the original grantee, who ultimately received the purchase

money advanced B by C, was the recipient of the junior mortgage, in no way

effected the decision in the case, for the court said: "Whether or not the de-

fendant, C. H. Brock, is estopped, in the absence of fraud, from disputing the
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tered his junior mortgage first; C later registered his purchase money
mortgage; finally, B records the deed to the land. 9 Applying to
these facts the rule of law first enunciated in this paragraph, it is
difficult to understand just why "priority of registration does not
determine priority of lien."
It is well settled in this state that no notice, however full and
formal, can take the place of registration."0 Viewing this principle,
together with the decision in the instant case, it is interesting to
speculate just how the court will handle the case where a junior
mortgagee without notice of the existence of a prior purchase money
mortgage takes a mortgage from one who he knows owns the mortgaged premises, and puts it on record before the registration of either
the deed to the mortgagor, or the prior purchase money mortgage
executed by the mortgagor to the original vendor of the land. It
seems unfortunate that the court was not presented with this state
of facts before it was called upon to decide the instant case. It is
earnestly submitted that for the purposes of the present decision, our
registration statutes were not given their usual strict application.
At any rate, it is difficult to anticipate how the court can consistcntly
follow its decision in the instant case into all of its logic-l applications and variations without undermining the effect of the Connor
Act.
ALvxN S. KARTus.
priority of the lien created by the deed of trust to Kramer, trustee (for the
Trust Co.) over the deed of trust to Aydlett, trustee (for Brock), under
which he claims, need not be decided."
"The fact that the deed was the last of the three instruments to go on
record should in no way effect the rights of the parties to this action, since the
registration of an instrument is not a requisite to passing title as between the
parties. C. S. 3309; Warren v. Williford, 148 N. C. 474, 62 S. E. 697 (1908) ;
Weston v. Lumber Co. 160 N. C. 263, 75 S. E. 800 (1912). The Court indicates, however, that liens upon land do not attach until the registration of the
deed. Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 is cited as in support
of this principle. Here, again, the instant case can be distinguished from the
operation of the principle enunciated in the case cited. Johnson v. Leavitt, as
well as Cyc. 1381, cited therein, holds that liens, as against after-acquiredproperty vest at the same time, equally and without reference to the date of docketing. In the instant case, we are not dealing with liens against after-acquired
property, but with a mortgage against an undisputed present title, capable of
being encumbered at any time after the execution and delivery of the deed.
"0Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1873) ; Blacknall v. Hancock, 182
N. C. 369, 109 S. E. 72 (1921).

